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FOREWORD: THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES*
LINDA R. HIRSHMAN**
My mail today included volume 1, number 1, of The Defender, a
publication of the Individual Rights Foundation' devoted to articles
on the threat to free speech from feminists and other suspicious polit-
ical groups. To my puzzlement, since none of the writers2 is described
as an historian, several of the pieces employed images from a bygone
era: feminists promote "orthodoxy, 3 suggest burnings at the stake,
4
engage in holy wars, 5 and finally, disguise their "Old Feudalism" as
"New Liberalism" 6-this last accusation explicitly tarring the critics of
the existing order with the dirtiest word in American politics:
medieval.
In the minds of most Americans, the awful, scary Middle Ages
(remember "Dark Ages"??!) were thankfully replaced by enlightened
liberal individualism, which has its happiest and purest home in the
United States. According to this picture, the Middle Ages had ortho-
doxy in truth and knowledge, hierarchy in politics, and stasis in social
relations. Liberalism has freedom of inquiry, democracy in politics,
and openness in social relations.
* With apologies to Johan Huizinga
** Professor of Law and Director, Women's Legal Studies Institute, Chicago-Kent College
of Law. Professor Hirshman was the moderator of the program "Is The Law Male?" put on by
the American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession, August, 1994. This
Essay and this Symposium are dedicated to Justice Judith Kaye, whose continued commitment
to the life of the mind and the project of gender justice built a bridge between academy and
profession over which the rest of us are merely passing.
1. A division of the Center for the Study of Popular Culture, a nonprofit organization with
a special nonprofit organization tax break from the United States government in the form of a
third-class mail U.S. Postage permit.
2. Volume 1, number 1, included articles by The Defender editors John Howard, Erik Gun-
derson, Bill Cerveny, Douglas A. Jeffrey, and Henry Mark Holzer. In case you're interested,
circulation management and art are entrusted to females, none of whom contributed any opinion
of any sort to issue 1, volume 1.
3. John Howard, Suing Private Institutions, THE DEFENDER, Mar. 1994, at 1.
4. Bill Cerveny, Counter Coup: Rolling Back the Attack on Free Speech, THE DEFENDER,
Mar. 1994 at 4 ("Through campus speech codes and sensitivity training seminars, some university
administrators-working hand in hand with radical feminists, gay activists and radical multicul-
turalists-have operated an auto da fe on many campuses to establish a regimen of thought
control and suppress free speech.").
5. Id. ("[M]embers of ATO [a college fraternity] suddenly found themselves the target of
a jihad by radical feminists ... ").
6. Douglas A. Jeffrey, The Old Liberalism and The New, THE DEFENDER, Mar. 1994, at 10.
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What this leaves out, of course, is that any dominant system can
perpetuate itself and become, in the bad sense of the word, "medie-
val." In the pages of The Defender, as in the American legal system,
and, as I will describe below, the American law schools, liberalism-
that most promising of political and legal orders-has often been
turned to orthodoxy and become everything it was supposed to have
replaced. "Is the Law Male?" the participants in this Symposium
asked at a standing room only program of the ABA Commission on
Women in the Profession last August. If we had had more room on
the marquee, we would have asked, "Is the Law Male and Therefore
Medieval in the Bad Sense of Orthodox in Making Only Male Experi-
ence Count, Hierarchical in Perpetuating Existing Relationships of
Domination, and Static in Enshrining Existing Social Practices?"
In her introduction to this Symposium, Chief Justice of the New
York Court of Appeals Judith S. Kaye tells us "there is a difference"
between men and women, in law and out, in power and out.7 As the
title of the Symposium, "Is The Law Male?" suggests so graphically, if
the liberal/legal order cannot provide the basic human goods of secur-
ity and reasonable prosperity to people of "different" genders and
races than the white men who thought liberalism up, it is entitled to
no more respect than the admittedly orthodox, hierarchical, static and
exclusive medieval order it replaced. Worst of all, when liberal con-
cepts are used to defend medieval outcomes, liberalism needs to be
not only defended, but rescued, from its so-called "defenders."
As the articles from our contributors reflect, although no one said
it directly, feminist legal thought and action considers feminism as en-
titled to the mantle of the best part of the American liberal/legal tradi-
tion. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Director of the National Judicial
Education Program of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and the National Association of Women Judges, tells us that we
should not bill ourselves as feminists when teaching judges and law-
yers about women's lives and concerns, but teach proper attention to
women's concerns as a natural part of liberal justice.8 Mary Becker,
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, describes
beautifully the way in which concepts of equality and nonsubordina-
tion, deeply embedded in the best American liberal tradition, proved
amazingly flexible and capacious in the hands of the brilliant theo-
7. Judith S. Kaye, Is the Law Male?, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 301 (1993) (emphasis
omitted).




rists-Catharine MacKinnon, Robin West, Carol Gilligan, Peggy Ra-
din-who have engendered theories of legitimate female claims.9
Lynn Hecht Schafran read those theories and found she "had been
speaking feminist theory" all along.10
Leslie Bender, Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of
Law, and her student Perette Lawrence, trace the structure of Doe v.
Linder Construction Company," a decision refusing to find a tort
when a landowner's negligent act resulted in a householder's rape.12
With her usuai painstaking care, Bender shows how traditional con-
cepts of liberal justice-negligence, foreseeability, etc.-are ample to
provide women with bodily security, which is the foundation of the
liberal state. All the judges needed to do was to see the foreseeability
of gender violence in the lives of women-as the great liberal theorists
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke foresaw the religious violence in the
lives of men and produced liberalism in an effort to cabin the killing.
Dorothy Roberts, Associate Professor, Rutgers University School
of Law-Newark, cautions us that theories that seek to reclassify some
rapes as violations of female sexual autonomy, like all other efforts to
encompass women within liberalism, will require relentless scrutiny of
our unexamined assumptions of who is entitled to autonomy, with
special attention to race and poverty.1 3 So sexual assault on a passed-
out black woman in a fraternity house' 4 carries vastly different mean-
ing in the real American justice system than unconsented knee sur-
gery on an anesthetized white athlete does.15 Roberts makes the
hardest criticism of feminism's liberalism, because she reminds us that
all sexual exchanges take place against a background of a medieval
hierarchy of race and gender that makes any liberal consent standard
very fragile. 16 Yet she does not give up on the project. After all, Rob-
9. Mary Becker, Four Feminist Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy,
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 303 (1993).
10. Schafran, supra note 8, at 399.
11. Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is the Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Prop-
erty Managers' Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993).
12. Justice Martha Craig Daughtrey of the Tennessee Supreme Court participated in the
discussion of Doe, from which she dissented, at the program. On November 30, 1993, Justice
Daughtrey was confirmed as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Is the law male? Not always.
13. Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
359 (1993).
14. Id. at 368.
15. Id. at 384-86.
16. Id. at 374-81.
19931
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
erts' touchstone-freedom from subordination' 7-was one of the crit-
ical issues of original liberalism.
18
Freedom from inappropriate particularism was also a critical is-
sue in the transition from medieval to modern liberal justice.' 9 As
most lawyers learned at some point in their legal education, juries
went from being people who saw and had an opinion of the event to
their polar opposite-people who had no opinion about the matter.
20
Thus New York University Professor Sylvia Law and matrimonial law-
yer Patricia Hennessey produce the news that strict, objective and
general standards for child custody at divorce actually help women
more than relational, contextual standards do.2' This is so, because
judges are often so biased and often unconsciously biased against the
value of female lives. Containing the judges' static and hierarchical
world view with traditional liberal rule of law standards is often wo-
men's only hope for justice.
The problem is worse, of course, when the so-called standards are
themselves manifestations of the preference for male norms. Then
liberal concepts of fixed standards simply enshrine in the law medieval
orthodoxy about how people act. New York University Professor Sa-
rah Burns tells us of how standards for credibility of witnesses incor-
porate a male norm of contemporaneity and consistency and of her
efforts to use experts to explain the deviance of female victims of sex-
ual abuse from this orthodox standard of where truth lies.22 Yet
Burns's work, addressing some of the most difficult of problems
before the legal system, still works well within the liberal tradition of
occurrence witnesses and objective standards for truth. Credibility
still matters; only its manifestations must be changed to accommodate
women's experiences.
This Symposium then is living refutation of the Defenders' effort
to banish from the liberal tradition those who would seek to enhance
and protect women's lives. What is revealed again and again is not the
failure of institutions of tort, civil rights, and rules of evidence, but the
curious survival into the liberal regime of medieval holdovers:
orthodoxies about whose work has value in custody fights, hierarchies
17. Id. at 387.
18. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 39-46 (1989).
19. Id. at 171.
20. Id. at 111-47.
21. Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 354-58 (1993).




of race and gender in rape cases, static visions of a bucolic world
where rape is endemic. As I have written elsewhere, I do not believe
that liberalism, particularly in its late twentieth century rigid insis-
tence on individual rights as the solution to all social problems, can
answer all the questions of a complex and dynamic legal order.23 But
if liberalism were drunk neat, rather than perverted into a cover story
for an orthodox, hierarchical and static social order, it would certainly
go a long way.
'h s is true in every area of the iaw our participants have ad-
dressed. This is also true about the subject of my contribution to the
Symposium: legal education. Many law schools, especially the elite
private law schools, which pride themselves on their fidelity to liberal
merit-based individualism, are in fact medieval institutions. Protected
by huge endowments from both the purse of the market 24 and the
sword of the polity, they exist remote from accountability to modern
life. No existing structure of accreditation dares to touch their institu-
tional behavior.
Where the checks and balances of liberalism are weak, medieval
practices thrive. Thus, in the Socratic pedagogical method that is
uniquely characteristic -of legal teaching, liberal concepts of free ex-
pression are often used to mask a medieval orthodoxy about what
counts as knowledge. Science, surveys, facts from opinions count.
Emotions, stories, facts left out of legal opinions do not. Economic
theories count; feminist theories do not.25 Sometimes the teachers call
on and reward with praise opinions that emulate their beliefs. Worst
of all, students themselves are turned, consciously or not into the en-
forcers of the orthodox. As numerous reports reflect, student obscen-
ity and mockery construct in the classroom the static social hierarchy
of the archaic world. Brandishing a medieval privilege from public
power-academic freedom from the state-law school can enshrine a
23. Linda R. Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens: Legal Education and the Virtues
of the Ruler, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1905 (1993) [hereinafter Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us
Chickens]; Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "A," 70 TEX. L. REV. 971 (1992); Linda R.
Hirshman, The Rape of the Locke: Race, Gender, and the Loss of Liberal Virtue, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1133 (1992); Linda R. Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88
MICH. L. REV. 983 (1990) (reviewing WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSE: GOODS, VIR-
TUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991) and THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. ED-
SALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS
(1991)).
24. Discussion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1689-90 (1993); Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us
Chickens, supra note 23, at 1934.
25. Years of teaching memories on file in brain of author.
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private order of male dominance that is truly medieval in its
hierarchy.
26
On the faculty level, studies of the doctrine of a particular kind of
legal order is often the knowledge orthodoxy, 27 with only limited ex-
ception for subjects, like economics or empirical research, that are
considered "scientific" or preservative of the social status quo. The
orthodoxy of knowledge is enforced by appointments procedures.
Unlike many other disciplines, law school jobs are not posted or de-
scribed. Rather, existing faculty propose people they know. No writ-
ten criteria for performance exist. Such oral criteria as exist are
perpetuated without any proof of job-relatedness. Appointment is
subject everywhere to the black ball of a small number of votes, and
voting is often secret.2
8
The legal profession is almost one quarter female; law classes
about half female. The faculty at many prestigious law schools in the
American academy, Harvard and Yale, the University of Chicago and
Northwestern, are around ninety percent white and male.29 Why not?
What would be the composition of the work force in the Birmingham,
Alabama, steel mills if any four or five workers on the shop floor
could black ball any one who applied to be a steelworker? 30 How
many anchor women would be on TV if there were no ratings and no
FCC? What race or gender would the average Chicago cop be if the
openings were never posted and the job test were who knows the al-
derman with the most clout?
31
26. Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to be Part of a Perpetual First
Wave or The Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 799 (1988); Richard H.
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (1988); Symposium, The Voices of Women: A Symposium on Women in
Legal Education, 77 IowA L. REV. 1 (1991); Carl W. Tobias, Engendering Law Faculties, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1990); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty
Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988).
27. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
28. Chris Black, Harvard Law Sees Setbacks in Bid to Diversify its Faculty, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 18, 1993, at 44.
29. In 1992-1993, Harvard academic faculty (excluding clinic, writing and emeritus faculty)
was about 89% male; Yale the same; Chicago 87% male, Northwestern a stunning 90% male.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOoLs, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1992-
93, at 52-53, 108-09, 36, 75-76 (1992).
30. See, e.g., United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
31. Some students and administrators at Chicago-Kent tried to bring some scientific, objec-
tive data gathering to law school appointments-a truly liberal undertaking. Just a little of their
incredibly rich research into faculty scholarly productivity is given below. It shows that there are
33 women among the top 151 most prolific scholars; any one of them would raise the average
productivity at Harvard or Yale or Chicago or Northwestern by a lot. I believe that only four of
the top 33 women worked at these four schools at the conclusion of the survey in 1993 (Harvard




Besides the impact on the lives of the individual women scholars
and teachers, the orthodoxy, hierarchy and stasis of these schools of
law mean that the true harvest of the liberalism latent in the law will
be retarded until at least another whole generation of women have
THE MOST PROLIFIC WOMEN FACULTY PUBLISHERS IN THE
MOST-CITED LAW REVIEWS
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This preliminary data was provided by Daniel Seltzer, a student, from his forthcoming study
of faculty productivity. The ranks are based on the average number of publications (of 10 pages
or more) published in the three volumes beginning in 1990, 1991, and 1992 in four categories: (1)
the ten most-cited law reviews (excluding the home review); (2) the 10 most-cited law reviews
(including the home review); (3) the twenty most-cited reviews (excluding the home review); and
(4) the twenty most-cited reviews (including the home review). Ties are resolved by the average
number of pages over the same four categories. The top 10 reviews are determined by combina-
tions of citation counts in Shepard's and the Social Science Citation Index. The top 10 reviews
are California, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Texas, Virginia,
and Yale. The next ten reviews are Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Lib-
erties Law Review, Journal of Legal Studies, NYU, Northwestern, Southern California, UCLA,
and Vanderbilt. Seltzer plans to add book publishing to the final published counts of the most
prolific law faculties and individuals.
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passed through their doors. As I have said before, lawyers are the
ruling class of American liberal democracy. 32 Who teaches the pro-
spective family court judges that only male lifestyles have value?
33
Who teaches state supreme court justices that rape is unforeseeable?
Or, worse, who teaches foreseeability without a mention of rape thus
concealing both rape and the failure to teach rape?
Putting together the rich and varied body of work of which this
Symposium is the tiniest glimpse, I found myself wondering a related
question: is the bar exam male? Feminist legal theory has, against all
odds just described, and largely through the agency of a tiny handful
of women scholars, mostly not at elite law schools, and lawyers and
judges, changed the American social landscape through law. Other-
wise, The Defender would just be enjoying the static social order, not
trying to defend it. If all other oversight agencies of legal education
have failed to bring many law schools into the modern era, including
feminist jurisprudence on the bar examination might be a salutary
prod. I know of not a single state where the elementary concepts of
sexual discrimination and harassment and the foreseeability of rape
and the enforcement of surrogacy contracts, for example, are part of
the bar examination.
Yet here we are. The Chief Justice of the highest court of New
York, the newest appointee to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, wo-
men from popular and elite law schools alike, rethinking every aspect
of the legal structure from agency to zygotes. In the words of Justice
Judith Kaye, there is a difference. Vive la difference.
32. See Hirshman, Nobody in Here But Us Chickens, supra note 23.
33. Law & Hennessey, supra note 22.
[Vol. 69:293
